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What Do Unions Do to Temporary Employment?
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In the EU, one in seven employees work on temporary contracts associated with lower pay 
and less training. Using workplace-level data from 21 countries, I show that, in contrast with 
previous evidence for the US, unionized workplaces are more likely to use temporary 
employment across Europe. To address the endogeneity of unions, I then use a British 
dataset and exploit variation over time and across occupations to control for workplace 
unobserved heterogeneity. This confirms that unions contribute to creating contract duality in 
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Temporary employment is one of the distinctive features of contemporary European labour
markets. Over the 90￿ s, it accounted for most of the employment growth in Germany, Italy
and France (OECD, 2002) and today around 14% of EU employees work on contracts of
limited duration. A dramatic increase in the spread of temporary employment has also
been observed in the US where, between 1979 and 1995, agency employment grew ￿ve times
faster then overall employment (Autor, 2003). Previous studies have shown that temporary
employees are paid less, receive less training and report lower satisfaction than workers with
similar observable characteristics on permanent contracts in the UK (Booth et al., 2002;
Arulampalam and Booth, 1998; Arulampalam et al., 2004) and in other countries (OECD,
2002; Kahn, 2007; Arulampalam et al., 2004; Brunello et al., 2007). There is also some
evidence of a negative wellbeing e⁄ect of temporary contracts (OECD, 2008) and concerns
have been raised that a large share of temporary employment could be welfare reducing
(Kahn, 2007). Some studies have found evidence that a temporary job can be a stepping
stone towards a permanent one in Europe (Booth et al., 2002; Ichino et al., 2008), but not
in the US (Autor and Houseman, 2002, 2008). Even for Europe, however, the data suggest
that individuals with lower education struggle to make the transition to more stable jobs
(OECD, 2008; Guell and Petrongolo, 2007).
It is therefore not surprising that in recent years temporary employment has increas-
ingly attracted the attention of both Economists and policy makers, with growing e⁄ort
dedicated to study the reasons behind its widespread use. Earlier contributions have uncov-
ered evidence that the ￿ring costs entailed by Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) for
permanent workers encourage ￿rms to use less-protected temporary workers (Booth et al.,
2002; Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Autor, 2003; Kahn, 2007). This paper focuses on the
role of another important feature of European labour markets presenting some similarities
with EPL, i.e. unions. In fact, unions are known to disproportionately represent permanent
workers1 and, like ￿ring costs, increase the bargaining power of employees.
If a union represents mainly permanent insiders, it might accept or encourage the use of
temporary employment as a bu⁄er for its members. Unions can also increase the de facto
￿ring cost for permanent workers, either by directly bargaining over severance pay or by
assisting workers facing the risk of dismissal therefore providing an incentive for the ￿rm to
use temporary contracts. Firms can also try to react to union wage pressure by employing
cheaper temporary workers. On the other hand, a union can be reluctant to accept the use
of temporary employees because they are less likely to be union members. The overall e⁄ect
of unions on the probability of using temporary employment is therefore a priori ambiguous.
Besides furthering our understanding of one the main features of modern European labour
1The overwhelming evidence on this point is described later in the paper.
2markets, this paper also provides new insights on the ability of ￿rms to adjust employment in
the presence of unions. The macroeconomic implications for price hystheresis of employment
adjustment costs have been emphasized, among others, by Hamermesh (1996) and Layard
et al. (2005). It has been suggested that unions limit the ￿ exibility of ￿rms in managing
employment reductions (Booth, 1995), but Hamermesh (1996) points out that a union rep-
resenting the median worker will decrease the relative costs to employers of changing the
employment of junior workers. This latter observation is consistent with the evidence that
layo⁄s are not less frequent in unionised sectors (Medo⁄, 1979). Since temporary employ-
ment can be used by ￿rms to adjust labour more easily, the analysis of the e⁄ects of unions
on ￿rms employment ￿ exibility must also take into account this additional channel. Based
on two US studies, Verma (2003) concludes that unions reduce ￿ exibility, but the relevance
of such a ￿nding for Europe is unclear given the institutional di⁄erences between the two
labour markets.
The analysis begins with data from the Establishment Survey on Working Time and
Work-Life Balance (ESWT) covering workplaces from 21 European countries. While the vast
majority of the literature on the determinants of temporary employment is based on data on
individual workers, there is evidence that in most European countries temporary employment
is largely involuntary2, suggesting that ￿rms rather than workers play an important role in
the decision to use temporary contracts.
The analysis based on ESWT provides the ￿rst evidence that across Europe unionised
workplaces are more likely to use temporary employment. In order to try and address the
potential endogeneity of union status, I then turn to a dataset that o⁄ers other sources of
identi￿cation at the cost of having to restrict attention to a single country, the UK. I ex-
ploit di⁄erent features of the Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) including
potential instruments and some longitudinal variation in the data. Furthermore, I imple-
ment a novel approach to WERS that takes advantage of the availability of information on
individual occupations within a workplace. In particular, I rearrange the dataset so that
each occupation in a given workplace becomes the unit of observation. This results in a
dataset with repeated observations for each workplace that allows the use of the standard
within-group estimator to remove the e⁄ect of workplace-level unobservable variables.
Overall, the evidence indicates that workplace unionisation increases the probability of
using temporary employment. The European data show an average e⁄ect on the probability
that a workplace uses ￿xed-term (agency) workers of 5% (3%), but estimates from WERS
suggests even larger e⁄ects. There is generally no evidence of any e⁄ect when bargaining does
2Data available from Eurostat suggests that more than half of employees working on a temporary contract
in the EU are doing so because they could not ￿nd a permanent job (data for 2004, 2005 and 2006). Data
from the UK Labour Force Survey show that around a quarter of all British temporary workers would rather
work on a permanent contract. Among agency workers alone, the proportion is above 40%.
3not take place at the workplace, with the exception of a negative e⁄ect of organization-level
bargaining on the probability of ￿xed-term workers in the largest occupation.
2 Theoretical considerations
There is substantial evidence that temporary workers are less unionized than permanent
workers. Labour Force Survey data for the UK show that only 18% of temporary workers
are union members as opposed to around 30% of permanent workers3. Data from the 2004
wave of the European Social Survey suggests that only 12% of British workers on contracts
of limited duration are union members, while more than 22% of permanent workers are. No-
ticeable di⁄erences are observed even in countries with traditionally high union membership
such as Sweden (68% for permanent workers, 51% for temporary workers), Norway (59% vs
28%) and Finland (60% vs 46%). Hence, it seems legitimate to assume that unions only
represent permanent workers. The dominance of permanent workers￿interests in the union
objective function can easily be rationalize within a median-voter model of union preferences.
A standard right-to-manage model where the wage is set by Nash bargaining predicts
that the wage will be an increasing function of the union strength (Booth, 1995). Hence,
a union representing permanent workers will increase their relative cost leading the ￿rm to
use more temporary employment. The union can even directly bene￿t from the presence
of temporary workers, since they enter the production function but do not appropriate any
of the resulting rents. This point has been noted in the insider-outsider model where the
outsiders￿wage is not bargained over (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004).
Consideration of a multiperiod setting provides further intuitions. Firstly, unions can
increase the expected ￿ring cost for permanent workers leading the ￿rm to hire more tempo-
rary workers. This can happen either because the union bargains over severance pay (Booth,
1995; Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004) or because it simply provides workers with assistance in
case of dismissal. Also, in a world with uncertainty following the wage bargaining process,
temporary workers might provide a bu⁄er for permanent workers (Bentolila and Dolado,
1994).
Finally, since temporary workers are less unionized and can reasonably be assumed to be
less likely to engage in industrial actions, the presence of temporary workers can undermine
the union strength. On the other hand, ￿rms that intend to undermine the union strength
may be more likely to resort to temporary workers. The overall e⁄ect of unions on the
probability of employing temporary workers is therefore a priori ambiguous.
3Data from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey, Household dataset, 2004.
43 Empirical literature
A small number of papers dedicated to temporary employment has touched upon the rela-
tionship between temporary employment and unions. For example, Kahn (2007) uses data
on workers from seven countries and ￿nd that the positive e⁄ect of EPL on the incidence of
temporary employment for some demographic groups is stronger where collective bargaining
coverage is higher. Data on British individuals also reveal a small negative correlation or
no correlation at all between working on a temporary contract and the probability of being
covered by union bargaining (Francesconi and Garcia-Serrano, 2004; Booth and Francesconi,
2003). This paper di⁄ers substantially from these earlier contributions in that it uses data
on workplaces rather than individuals. The fact that a large share of temporary employment
appears to be involuntary4 suggests that ￿rms￿characteristics may play an important role
in explaining the use of limited-duration contracts.
Using data on Spanish ￿rms, Francesconi and Garcia-Serrano (2004) ￿nd no evidence
of a link between the share of temporary employment and workplace unionisation. Bryson
(2007) uses data from the 2004 wave of WERS and ￿nds a weak positive correlation between
unions and the use of agency workers. This paper uses workplaces data from across Europe
and from the UK to present the ￿rst evidence for almost the whole of the EU and to try and
address some of the possible limitations of these previous studies arising from the potential
endogeneity of union status.
Two other studies have considered samples of ￿rms from the US where temporary em-
ployment is less widespread than in Europe. Gramm and Schnell (2001) use a sample of less
than 100 ￿rms from the state of Alabama and ￿nds a negative correlation between union
coverage and the probability of using temporary employees in the main occupational group.
Houseman (2001) uses a sample of more than 500 ￿rms from the US and reaches the same
conclusion. Finally, using aggregate data for the US states, Autor (2003) shows that the
growth of agency employment was faster in states where unions declined more slowly.
4 Empirical strategy
In order to try and address the potential endogeneity of union status, this paper exploits
several sources of identi￿cation from two di⁄erent datasets. The analysis begins with data
from the Establishment Survey on Working Time and Work-Life Balance (ESWT) which
provides detailed data on a large sample of establishments from 21 European countries.
While this allows to present the ￿rst empirical evidence on the relation between unionisation
and temporary employment across European ￿rms, the causal interpretation of the estimates
4In the sense that a large proportion of temporary workers across Europe say that the reason why they
work on a temporary contract is that they could not ￿nd a permanent one.
5rests on the assumption that union status is exogenous conditional on the available covari-
ates. Hence, I then turn to another dataset, the Workplace Employment Relations Survey
(WERS), which allows alternative identi￿cation strategies at the cost of having to restrict
the focus to a single country, the UK.
WERS has several important features. In the ￿rst place, its broad scope allows the
adoption of a ￿ner speci￿cation, therefore making the assumption of conditional exogeneity of
union status more credible than with the European dataset. Second, it provides information
useful to test for exogeneity of union status and enables me to exploit (i) variation over time
and (ii) across occupations to remove the e⁄ect of workplace-level confounders. This appears
the ￿rst paper to exploit this latter aspect of WERS. Finally, for each occupation within a
workplace, WERS allows to see the level at which collective bargaining takes place (if at all).
This is a very useful piece of information given the evidence that workplace characteristics
tend to play a more important role when bargaining is decentralized (Layard et al., 2005).
4.1 The endogeneity of union status
Since temporary workers are less likely to be union members, their presence could decrease
the likelihood that a workplace becomes unionized. Union status could, therefore, be endoge-
nous in an equation for temporary employment due to reverse causality. A counterobjection
is that union status is a structural feature of the ￿rm unlikely to be a⁄ected by the decision
to hire temporary workers which can be reverted in every period. In section 6.1, I discuss the
validity of lagged employment as an instrument and then use it to test for evidence against
the assumption of exogeneity. Since the validity of such tests stems from the validity of the
instrument itself, the reassuring results of these tests cannot be taken as de￿nite. Unfortu-
nately, nothing more can be done to tackle the issue of reverse causality using WERS, but
other features of the dataset can be exploited to try and address other sources of endogeneity.
A major threat to the exogeneity of union status arises from possible unobservable vari-
ables which might be correlated with both union status and the propensity to use temporary
employment. I try to address this issue in two di⁄erent ways. First, I use the longitudinal
variation in WERS to control for time-invariant heterogeneity across workplaces. In this
framework, I discuss the strong exogeneity assumption (conditional on the ￿xed-e⁄ects) and
conduct a simple test suggested by Wooldridge (2002). The models and the results using
panel data are described in detail in section 6.2.
Second, I propose a novel use of the dataset that fully exploits the availability of in-
formation on occupations within a given ￿rm, a previously neglected aspect of WERS. In
particular, I rearrange the dataset so that each occupation within a ￿rm becomes the unit of
observation. That makes it possible to apply standard panel data models to a sample where
each ￿rm (the equivalent of an individual in standard panel data) is observed in several
6occupations (time periods). By using the within-group estimator, I then e⁄ectively remove
any ￿rm-level confounders while also allowing the e⁄ect of observable ￿rm characteristics to
di⁄er across occupations by suitable interaction terms. The details on this last step of the
empirical analysis are provided in section 6.3.
All the estimates are obtained from linear probability models. This seems a relatively
mild restriction given the discrete nature of most of the regressors included in the econo-
metric speci￿cations (Angrist, 2001; Wooldridge, 2002) and has clear advantages on terms
of interpretation. The argument for a linear model is even stronger for the longitudinal and
within-￿rm analysis of sections 6.2 and 6.3 where ￿xed-e⁄ect estimators are employed. In
fact, while nonlinear models could be used, a probit model would yield inconsistent estimates
due to the incidental parameter problem and the logit model would not allow estimation of
the marginal e⁄ects of interest exactly because of the lack of assumptions on the distribution
of the unobservables.
5 The use of temporary employment in European ￿rms
5.1 Data
The Establishment Survey on Working Time and Work-Life Balance (ESWT) is a unique
dataset covering a sample of more than 21000 workplaces from the EU-15 countries and 6
of the new members which joined in 2004 (the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Hungary, Latvia,
Poland and Slovenia)5. Among other things, the management is asked whether any ￿xed-
term workers and agency workers were employed in the workplace in the 12 months before
the survey. As for unions, the ESWT provides information on workers￿representation at
the workplace. The national questionnaires consider the main forms of representation in
each country which can be grouped into two broad categories: unions and works councils.
The main di⁄erence between the two is that works councils are generally elected by all
workers rather than just union members. The available empirical literature indicates that
works councils and unions do not di⁄er substantially in their e⁄ects. For example, studying
German works councils, Addison et al. (2006) ￿nd that they increase wages, even after
controlling for higher-level collective bargaining. It is also known that in most countries
where works councils are the main form of representation, they are dominated by union
members (ETUI-REHS, 2008; Addison et al., 2006). Hence, formal di⁄erences in workplace
representation are unlikely to pose serious problems for my analysis and in this section I will
use the word "union" with reference to any form of workplace representation recorded in the
dataset.
5The sample is representative of all non-agricultural establishments with at least 10 employees. Interviews
were conducted in 2004 for the EU-15 countries and in 2005 for the remaining ones.
7The role of workplace representation does vary greatly across countries, and sometimes
even within countries. To see if noticeable di⁄erences are found depending on the importance
of workplace representation in di⁄erent nations, I look at the estimates for countries grouped
by a centralization index which indicates the most important level at which collective bar-
gaining takes place. I use the most recent version of the index produced by OECD (2004)
which refers to the year 2000.
Table 1 reports the share of workplaces which used ￿xed-term workers in the 12 months
before the survey for each of the 21 European countries by union status. With the only
exception of Hungary, in every single country ￿xed-term workers are more commonly used in
￿rms with workplace representation. Looking at the 21 countries together, the proportion of
workplaces with ￿xed-term workers is roughly 50% when there is no workplace representation
and 67% when there is some representation.
Table 9 shows the ￿gures for the use of agency workers. Again, unionized workplaces
are more likely to use agency workers in any country except for Portugal, Poland and Slove-
nia. Overall, 20% of non-union workplaces use agency workers against 36% of unionized
workplaces.
5.2 Econometric speci￿cation and the model
I now estimate a multivariate model for the probability that a ￿rm uses temporary employ-
ment. The ESWT o⁄ers a relatively large set of controls: ￿rm size (dummies), industry
dummies, dummy for independent establishment (rather than part of a larger company),
dummy for being the head of a larger organization, dummies for the share of skilled workers.
In addition, the survey asked managers whether the workplace has to cope with "major
variations" in the workload within di⁄erent time spans and whether such variations are fore-
seeable. This allows controlling for uncertainty therefore removing a possible source of bias
in the e⁄ect of union on the use of temporary employment. In fact, uncertainty is likely to
be a determinant of temporary employment, but it can also be correlated with union status
if workers promote unions to make their jobs safer. The ESWT also contains information on
whether the workplace faces di¢ culties in ￿nding skilled or unskilled workers which could
be correlated with temporary employment if limited-duration contracts are used to screen
workers. Finally, I can also use a number of other variables which are likely to be correlated
with temporary employment but can, at the same time, be suspected of endogeneity. I do
check the robustness of the results to the introduction of the following variables: a dummy
for a high absence rate, a dummy for di¢ culties in retaining workers, share of workers under
the age of 30 and above 50, share of female workers and share of employees working overtime.
85.3 Results for the EU and by country
The top panel of table 3 shows that unions are associated with a 5% increase in the probability
of using ￿xed-term workers in the EU-15. Albeit still positive, the e⁄ect is smaller and
statistically insigni￿cant in the 6 new EU members (column 2). The second panel of table 3
looks at the use of agency workers. The estimated e⁄ect of union is a statistically signi￿cant
3% in the EU-15, but a statistically insigni￿cant -1.3% for the new members6.
Table 4 reports the estimate of the union coe¢ cient in an equation for the use of ￿xed
term workers by country. Countries are grouped by the centralisation index of OECD (2004)
which indicates the most important level of bargaining in each country. In all but three of
the 21 countries considered the partial correlation between unions and the use of temporary
employment is positive. However, only in four countries is the coe¢ cient on union statisti-
cally signi￿cant at least at the 10% level: Italy (+15%), Austria (+10%), Sweden (+10%)
and Ireland (+16%). The UK7 (-3.5%), the Netherlands (-3%) and Cyprus (-5.7%) are the
countries where union attracts negative coe¢ cients which, however, are never statistically
signi￿cant. There is no apparent trend in the e⁄ects of unions as centralisation of the na-
tional bargaining system increases, although a simple regression of the estimated coe¢ cients
on the index reveals a weak positive correlation between the two.
The e⁄ect of workplace unions on the use of agency workers is found negative in 9
countries out of 21 (table 5). In two of these the coe¢ cient is actually almost exactly zero
(Denmark and Spain), while in Poland (-4.5%) and Portugal (-13.2%), it is statistically
signi￿cant at least at the 10% level. In the remaining ￿ve countries, including the UK8,
the union coe¢ cient is statistically insigni￿cant. Among the 12 countries where union is
positively correlated with the use of agency workers, the coe¢ cient is statistically signi￿cant
only in Italy (+6.7%), Ireland (+12.2%) and Greece (+17.2%). The p-value for union in
Germany (+6.5%) is just above 0.10. No clear pattern in the e⁄ect of union across di⁄erent
levels of centralisation appears and a simple bivariate regression con￿rms that the correlation
between the union coe¢ cients and the centralisation index is almost exactly zero.
In conclusion, these estimates indicate that the 5% e⁄ect of union on the probability
of using ￿xed-term workers re￿ ect a general positive correlation which is found in most
countries. For agency workers, on the other hand, the 3% e⁄ect seems to be the average of
rather di⁄erent e⁄ects across countries.
6None of the EU-level estimates are sensitive to the inclusion of the OECD indicators for employment
protection legislation, restrictions to ￿xed-term contracts and restrictions to temporary agency workers.
These results are available from the author.
7The point estimate of the union e⁄ect for the UK appears to be sensitive to the speci￿cation adopted. In
particular, when the dummy for independent establishment is excluded, a number of di⁄erent speci￿cations
actually yield a positive, small and statistically insigni￿cant coe¢ cient.
8For the probability of employing agency workers, the point estimates of the union e⁄ect in the UK are
not very sensitive to the speci￿cation adopted. In fact, they are always negative, but small (around -1%)
and statistically insigni￿cant.
96 Using a British dataset to address the endogeneity
of union status
I begin this part of the analysis with data from the 2004 wave of WERS. The sample
is restricted to workplaces in the private sector with more than 10 employees. Based on
the information available in this wave of WERS, I can build two (dummy) measures of
unionisation:
1. PresUnionMembers: 1 if there are some union members at the workplace;
2. UnionRecog: 1 if there is at least one union recognised at the workplace or at a higher
level in the same ￿rm.
It is not obvious which measure should be preferred. The dummy UnionRecog leaves
unclear the level at which the union is recognised and even more the level at which bargaining
actually takes place9. On the other hand, the dummy PresUnionMembers is certainly an
indicator of the presence of a union at the workplace, but it does not necessarily imply that
the union is actually recognised and involved in bargaining10.
Table 6 reports the share of private sector workplaces which use temporary employment
broken down by these two de￿nitions of union status. The UK estimates from WERS are
considerably smaller than those from ESWT. This is probably due to the fact that while
WERS asks whether any temporary workers are currently employed at the ￿rm, ESWT
asks whether any temporary employees were employed in the 12 months before the survey.
The share of workplaces using ￿xed-term workers is 23% (46% in ESWT) while that using
agency workers is 14% (31%). The WERS ￿gures, however, do con￿rm that unionised
￿rms are more likely to use either form of temporary employment, regardless of the precise
de￿nition of union status. For example, the row for union recognition indicates that 32%
of unionised workplaces and 22% of non-unionised workplaces employ ￿xed-term workers.
Agency workers, on the other hand, are used in 24% of unionised ￿rms but only in 13% of
non-unionised ones.
9Recall that the union variable from the ESWT was de￿ned as the presence of a recognised union at the
workplace. So, although it did not consider recognition at other levels, even in that case the actual level of
bargaining was unknown.
10The 2004 cross-section of WERS also allows to look at the e⁄ect of unions on the share of temporary
employment. However, this is not possible with the European dataset, the panel element of WERS nor
when occupational-level data from WERS are used. Hence, the paper focuses on the probability models.
For completeness, I can report that preliminary OLS results show a very small and statistically insigni￿cant
positive e⁄ect of both measures of unionisation on the share of both ￿xed-term and agency workers. This
can be taken as an approximate estimate of the average e⁄ect of unions on the whole population. For a
discussion of the caveats of the causal interpretation of the estimates from linear models with a censored
dependent variable see Angrist and Pischke (2009).
106.1 Cross-sectional analysis at the workplace-level
WERS allows the use of the following control variables: total employment11, a dummy for
independent establishments, a dummy for multiproduct ￿rms, age of the establishment, re-
gional and industry dummies, dummies for di⁄erent market shares (between 5% and 10%,
10-25, 25-50, more than 50% and no external trade), dummies for regional, national and
international market, a dummy for foreign competition, a dummy for whether demand de-
pends only on price, a dummy for the presence of labour or overall cost targets, employment
share of each occupation. To try and obviate the absence of ￿rm-level measures of uncer-
tainty in WERS, I attempt to identify clusters of ￿rms facing similar degrees of (product
market and/or labour market) uncertainty. I use two sets of interactions: one between in-
dustry and region and the other between industry and product market extension (regional,
national or international). The former should help capture the e⁄ect of similar labour market
uncertainty, whereas the latter that of product market uncertainty.
Even after including the set of controls just described, reverse causality and unobservable
￿rm characteristics pose a threat to the exogeneity of union status. To test for any evidence
against the exogeneity, I use the level of employment in 1998 to construct an instrument
(Empl6Ago) for union status in 2004 and carry out a robusti￿ed regression-based Hausman
test of the null of exogeneity12. For Empl6Ago to be a valid instrument, it must be partially
correlated with union status in 2004 and be exogenous to the propensity to use temporary
employment in 2004. Employment in 1998 can be expected to be correlated with union status
in 2004 because the latter is a strongly persistent feature of the workplace and employment
size is known to be a determinant of union status. Such correlation is con￿rmed by the ￿rst-
stage regressions reported below. Exogeneity of Empl6Ago holds under the mild assumption
that the level of employment six years earlier has no direct e⁄ect on temporary employment
once current employment is controlled for. This assumption seems plausible since the median
duration of temporary contracts in the UK has been found to be of only 12 months (Booth
et al., 2002)13. A potential objection is that large changes in employment levels might re￿ ect
higher uncertainty and would therefore be directly correlated with the propensity to use
temporary employment. Although such an objection cannot be rejected with certainty, the
11If the square of total employment is included the coe¢ cient on the union variables discussed below are
only slightly smaller.
12The exogeneity tests were also conducted within a probit model using a test based on Rivers and Vuong
(1988) and discussed in Wooldridge (2002). This is a test of the signi￿cance of the residuals from a linear
regression of the endogenous variable on the instruments in a probit of dependent variable on all exogenous
and endogenous regressors. The conclusions are the same obtained in the linear setting.
13They use data from the British Household Panel Survey from 1991 to 1997. They also report that
"almost all" temporary contracts have ended after 5 years. This is therefore even before new legislation
came into e⁄ect in 2002 preventing any ￿xed-term contracts from lasting more than 4 years. It is interesting
to note that in the document published in response to the consultation on such legislation, the Government
observed that such constraint would a⁄ect mainly the public sector which accounts for the majority of people
who have been in ￿xed-term employment for more than two years.
11aforementioned very short median duration of temporary contracts suggests that they are
not used to deal with the sort of uncertainty captured by employment ￿ uctuations over a
6-year period. To try and account for the role of uncertainty over a shorter time span, I
check the robustness of the exogeneity tests to the inclusion of the set of interactions for
uncertainty described above.
6.1.1 Results
Table 7 presents the estimates for the probability of using ￿xed-term workers. The uncon-
ditional estimates of columns 1 and 5 show that unionised ￿rms are much more likely to use
￿xed-term workers. The di⁄erence is +10% for union recognition and +14% for union mem-
bers. The introduction of several controls brings the estimates down to around 9% regardless
of the de￿nition adopted. The bottom panel of table 7 shows that, when ￿rms characteristics
are accounted for, the instrument Empl6Ago is strongly correlated with union status and
there is no evidence against the null of exogeneity.
Column 1 of table 8 shows that he raw e⁄ect of union recognition on the probability of
using agency workers is around 12%, while that of the presence of union members is about
10%. More than half of these di⁄erentials is explained by ￿rm characteristics whose inclusion
also reduces the precision of the estimates. The e⁄ect of union recognition remains slightly
larger, never falling below 5% across speci￿cations. In particular, a statistical signi￿cant
e⁄ect of 7.5% is obtained when a full set of interactions are included in column 4, while the
6.6% e⁄ect in column 3 is just on the verge of statistical signi￿cance at the 10% level. The
estimate for union members is, on the other hand, around 3% and even when uncertainty is
accounted for the 4% estimate remains statistically insigni￿cant. Finally, the tests reported
at the bottom of table 8 do not reveal any evidence against the null of exogeneity14.
Clearly, the validity of the exogeneity tests presented in this section critically hinges on
the validity of the instruments employed. To further investigate the robustness of the OLS
results, I now turn to other interesting features of WERS which can help to minimise the
bias from unobserved confounders.
6.2 Exploiting variation over time
In this step of the analysis I use the panel element of WERS which contains data on more
than 900 ￿rms observed in 1998 and in 2004. When the sample is limited to the private sector,
its actual size is slightly above 600 ￿rms. I estimate a model in ￿rst-di⁄erence to remove the
14The inclusion of further controls for demographic characteristics of the workforce in the ￿rm (share of
women, younger and older workers) does not alter the conclusions for either type of temporary workers.
Similarly, no substantial changes are observed when the share of days lost due to absence and the share of
workers who voluntarily left the ￿rm over the last year are included. These results are not reported here.
12e⁄ect of any time-invariant unobservable or omitted variables that could confound the e⁄ect
of unions. For example, workplaces with workers-friendly human resources practices might be
less prone to use temporary contracts and also more likely to recognize a union (assuming that
workers dislike temporary contracts and like unions). The cost of this increased robustness
is an inevitable loss of information likely to result in lower precision of the estimates.
Consistent estimation of the e⁄ect of union in this setting is based on the assumption of
strict exogeneity. Such assumption rules out correlation between current shocks to temporary
employment and current union status and also feedbacks from temporary employment in
1998 to union status in 2004. As pointed out by Wooldridge (2002) if union status is strictly
exogenous then the union status in 1998 (or 2004) should not be signi￿cant in a ￿rst-di⁄erence
regression for temporary employment. I present the results of this simple tests of exogeneity
along with the main results.
6.2.1 Econometric speci￿cation
The dependent variable is a binary variable for employing temporary employees in a given
￿rm. As for union status, I can use the same dummies as in the cross-sectional analysis: one
for the presence of any union members in the workplace and one for any union recognised
at the workplace or at a higher level. Because the 1998 cross-section questionnaire and
the 2004 panel questionnaire were not identical, for some of the explanatory variables there
are comparability issues across time. The regressors used and, where relevant, the problems
encountered are discussed in 10. Here it su¢ ces to say that the due to potential comparability
issues, the panel analysis is conducted on two samples. One includes all available private
sector workplaces, the other restricts the sample to workplaces which were trading externally
in 1998.
6.2.2 Results of ￿rst-di⁄erence estimation
Table 9 presents the ￿rst-di⁄erence estimates for the probability of employing ￿xed term
workers in the workplace. The point estimate for union recognition is negative across all
columns, but always fails to reach statistical signi￿cance. Also the size of the estimates varies
greatly depending on which sample is used. Some variation in the size of the coe¢ cient
across columns is also seen for union members, but the sign is consistently positive and
statistical signi￿cance at the 5% is reached in three of the four cases considered. Precision is
generally higher when the interactions for uncertainty are included, as one would probably
expect. The (statistically signi￿cant) estimates from the speci￿cation with the interactions
for uncertainty are 17% in the smaller sample and 12% in the larger one.
As a check of the validity of the ￿rst-di⁄erence estimates, the bottom panel of table 9
reports the results of the simple test for the strict exogeneity of union status suggested by
13Wooldridge (2002). The conclusion is consistent across samples and speci￿cations: there is
no evidence against the null of exogeneity.
The ￿rst di⁄erence results for the probability of agency workers in table 10 suggests
that the e⁄ect of union recognition is positive. The point estimates exceed 20% and are
statistically signi￿cant in the ￿rst sample, while they are closer to 15% in the larger sample
where their p-values are not smaller than 0.16. The evidence on the e⁄ect of union members,
on the other hand, is very clear. The coe¢ cients are statistically well de￿ned and their
magnitude is not sensitive to the sample used. When uncertainty is not accounted for the
e⁄ect is around 18% which increase to around 23% when the interactions with time are
included as well. No evidence against the null of strict exogeneity of union status is found
as shown in the bottom panel of table 10.
6.3 Within-workplace analysis to remove workplace-level confounders
This section presents what appears to be the ￿rst attempt to fully take advantage of the
availability of information on occupations within workplaces in WERS. Based on such infor-
mation,the following variables can be de￿ned for each occupation within a workplace:
1. a dummy for the presence of FixT and a dummy for agency workers;
2. three dummies indicating whether the pay a given occupation is set through nego-
tiations at the industry, organization or workplace level. These dummies are called
IndustryBarg, OrgBarg, and LocalBarg respectively;
3. a dummy for bargaining over pay taking place at any level. (AnyBarg);
4. a dummy for the presence of union members in the given occupation (UnionMemb).
To exploit variation across occupations in a given ￿rm, I model the propensity of work-
place f to use temporary employment in occupation o as:
yf;o = ￿ + ￿
0Xf;o + ￿
0Ff + ￿f + "f;o (1)
where Xf;o is a vector of occupation-level characteristics, Ff is a vector of workplace-
level characteristics (which are constant across occupations) and ￿f is a workplace ￿xed-
e⁄ect whose distribution is unrestricted. "f;o is an unobservable a⁄ecting the probability
of temporary workers in occupation o in workplace f. The model is estimated using the
within-￿rm estimator to allow the workplace-￿xed e⁄ect (and any workplace-level omitted
14characteristics) to be arbitrarily correlated with the regressors15. The only occupational
groups excluded is that of managers, leaving a maximum of 8 observations for each workplace.
The number of occupation-level controls included is forcefully restricted by data avail-
ability. Most of the occupation-level information available pertains to pay systems and it is
not clear whether they should be included at all, but I do check the robustness of the results
to the inclusion of these variables. I also extend the speci￿cation to allow the observable ￿rm
characteristics to have di⁄erent e⁄ects on the largest occupation (LOC). In this speci￿cation
I can also include additional occupation-level controls which are only available for the largest
occupation. The linear model in equation 1 therefore becomes:
yf;o = ￿ + ￿
0Xf;o + ￿
0Ff + ￿1LOCf;o + ￿2LOCf;o ￿ Kf;o + ￿
0LOCf;o ￿ Ff + ￿f + "f;o (2)
where LOCf;o is binary indicator for occupation o being the largest in ￿rm f ; Kf;o is a
vector of occupation characteristics observed only for the largest occupation. Because of data
limitations, I am forced to impose the strong assumption that such variables only matter for
the largest occupation.
6.3.1 Results for the within-workplace analysis
The results of the within-￿rm estimates for the probability of employing ￿xed-term workers in
a given occupation are reported in table 11. For each measure of unionisation, three di⁄erent
speci￿cations are adopted16. First, equation 1 is estimated with controls for occupations,
employment size within each occupation and a dummy for being the largest occupation
(LOC). Second, interactions of the LOC dummy with all the ￿rm-level variables previously
employed are added. Third, controls for the share of workers that quit the ￿rm in the last 12
months and for the percentage of days lost due to absence are included17. To help visualise
the e⁄ect of unions in the LOC, table 12 presents the sum of the union coe¢ cient plus the
coe¢ cient on the Union ￿ LOC interaction along with a Wald test for the null that such
15All estimates are weighted to account for the complex design of WERS. The weights for the WERS
cross-sectional dataset accounts for strati￿cation. When the unit of observation is smaller than the ￿rm,
weights should also take into account the probability of selection within the ￿rm. For example, the weights
for the employees in the WERS dataset are the ￿rm weights multiplied by the probability of selection of a
given employee (Chaplin et al., 2004). Since each occupation within a given ￿rm is selected into the "sample
of occupations" with probability one (at least in the balanced sample), no additional correction is neccessarry
in this case.
16The results of all three the speci￿cations proved substantially insensitive to the inclusion of (occupation-
level) controls for performance pay, pro￿t related pay, share ownership schemes, and job security guarantees.
They are also robust to the inclusion of a set of interactions between (1) industry, regions and LOC and (2)
industry, geographical extension of the market and LOC. Following the logic of the previous sections, such
interactions are meant to account for clusters of ￿rms facing similar uncertainty.
17These variables might well be one of the channels through which the e⁄ect of unions on temporary
employment unfolds, but they can aslo be suspected of endogeneity. Hence, it is not obvious whether they
should be included or not, especially if one is interested in a gross e⁄ect.
15overall e⁄ect is equal to zero.
The ￿rst column of table 11 shows that the e⁄ect of collective bargaining in a generic
occupation is positive but practically negligible. Column 7 con￿rms that this is true irrespec-
tive of the level at which bargaining takes place. Within the largest occupation, however
the level of bargaining seems to matter. In fact, although overall bargaining within the
LOC attracts a negative and statistically insigni￿cant coe¢ cient in column 2 of table 11,
in columns 8 and 9 organizational bargaining picks up a negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cient
which results in a net negative e⁄ect of around -15% as reported in table 12.
As for union members, I ￿nd a positive e⁄ect of 4.6% in a generic occupation (column
4 of table 11 ), with a p-value of 0.15. There is some statistically very weak evidence that
the e⁄ect of union members is slightly larger in the LOC (columns 5 and 6). The overall
e⁄ect of union members in the LOC exceeds 7% in the longest speci￿cation, but its p-value
is never below 0.14 (column 4 in table 12).
The results for the probability of agency workers in a given occupation are reported in
table 13. Overall bargaining attracts a positive coe¢ cient suggesting an e⁄ect just below 5%
(column 1), but the estimate is statistically insigni￿cant with a p-value around 0.18. Columns
2 and 3 show that the e⁄ect of bargaining is larger in the LOC, with an overall e⁄ect above 6%
(table 14) which is also statistically insigni￿cant. The dummies for bargaining at di⁄erent
levels in column 7 of table 13 indicate a 15% e⁄ect of workplace bargaining in a generic
occupation. The estimate is even larger in the LOC, reaching 24% (table 14). There is also
some evidence of a smaller e⁄ect of workplace bargaining outside the largest occupation of
around 8% with a p-value just above 0.11, but both the point estimate and its precision
decrease when controls for quits and absences are included (columns 8 and 9 of table 13).
On the other hand, there is no evidence of a positive e⁄ect of industry- or organization-level
bargaining in the LOC, as they both attracts negative and highly insigni￿cant coe¢ cients.
The presence of union members increases the probability of agency workers in a generic
occupation by a statistically signi￿cant 3% as shown in column 4 of table 13. Columns 5 and
6 show that the evidence that the e⁄ect is larger in the LOC is statistically weak, but the
estimates reported in table 14 suggest an overall e⁄ect of union members in the LOC of 4.1%
(p=0.12) which is just below 7% (p=0.02) when quit and absence rates are held constant18.
7 Summary of the main results
Consider ￿rst the evidence on ￿xed-term workers. The European data show that ￿rms with
workplace representation are more likely to use ￿xed-term workers. The large sixteen point
18The e⁄ect of union members is larger and estimated more precisely when the aforementioned set of
interactions to account for uncertainty are introduced in the speci￿cation. The results for the other union
measures do not change in noteworthy ways.
16di⁄erential in the raw data shrinks to a ￿ve points di⁄erence when confounding workplace
characteristics are accounted for. A positive e⁄ect is found in 18 of the 21 countries consid-
ered, although the statistical precision of the estimates varies. I then used a British dataset,
WERS, to try and deal with the potential endogeneity of union status. This dataset allows
to de￿ne two indicators for the presence of a union: (i) a dummy for the presence of any
union members at the workplace and (ii) a dummy for union recognition at the workplace or
at a higher level. As for union members, the evidence of a positive e⁄ect is clear. Both the
cross-section and longitudinal analysis support this conclusion. Also, in both cases simple
tests reveal no evidence against the null of exogeneity of union status. The estimates that
exploit variation across occupations are also positive but less precise. As for the size of the
e⁄ects, it is di¢ cult to draw a de￿nite conclusion. In particular, the cross-section estimate
is 8%, but the panel and the occupation-level estimates di⁄er in opposite directions. More
insights could come from exploiting simultaneously these two sources of variation (over time
and over occupations), but this is not possible with the current dataset.
When the dummy for union recognition (at any level) is used, the evidence is mixed. In
fact, the positive coe¢ cient of the cross-sectional analysis turns into a negative one in the
longitudinal analysis. A statistically insigni￿cant negative coe¢ cient was also obtained in
the British subsample of the EU dataset where unionisation was measured by the presence
of a recognised union at the workplace. The results from the occupation-level analysis based
on WERS may help explain these ￿ndings. For each occupation, in fact, the actual level at
which bargaining over pay takes place is known. I obtain an imprecisely estimated negative
coe¢ cient for bargaining (at any level) in the largest occupation, but the breakdown of the
bargaining levels reveals that this is entirely driven by organization-level bargaining. The
e⁄ect of the latter is a well de￿ned -15%. On the other hand, there is some weak evidence that
industry and workplace bargaining have a small positive e⁄ect on the probability of ￿xed-
term workers. This suggests that the negative but insigni￿cant coe¢ cients that I obtain for
union recognition (at any level) might be driven by the negative e⁄ect of bargaining at the
organization level.
Overall, it appears that whenever an indicator of the presence or activity of a union at
the workplace is used (workplace representation in the ESWT, presence of union members
or bargaining in the workplace in WERS), the evidence points to a positive e⁄ect on the
probability of ￿xed-term workers, although with varying degrees of statistical precision.
A similar conclusion can be reached for the probability of using agency workers. In this
case, the average European e⁄ect is around 3%, with a positive e⁄ect found in 12 of the 21
countries. The British data again provide no evidence against the exogeneity of union status
and the evidence of a positive e⁄ect of union members is clear across models, although again
considerable di⁄erences are observed between the estimates exploiting variation over time
and those exploiting variation across occupations. Also when unionisation is measured by a
17dummy for recognition (at any level) there is evidence of a positive e⁄ect. The occupation-
level estimates suggests that this is driven by a strong positive e⁄ect of workplace bargaining
(around +15%) which appears to be even larger in the main occupation.
8 Concluding remarks
Using data from two datasets and exploiting several sources of identi￿cation, this paper has
presented what appears to be the ￿rst empirical evidence of the e⁄ect of unions on the prob-
ability that ￿rms use temporary employment across Europe. Overall, the evidence indicates
that workplace unionisation increases the probability of using temporary employment. The
European data indicate an average e⁄ect on the probability that a workplace uses ￿xed-
term (agency) workers of 5% (3%). Such estimate is consistent with the smallest estimates
obtained from the British dataset, although di⁄erent models suggests much larger e⁄ects.
There is generally no clear evidence of an e⁄ect of unions when collective bargaining
does not take place at the workplace, with the exception of a strong negative e⁄ect of
organization-level bargaining on the probability that ￿xed-term workers are employed in
the largest occupation. Such heterogeneity of the e⁄ects across di⁄erent levels of collective
bargaining is puzzling. It is possible that the models used in this paper are not suited to
accurately capture the e⁄ect of bargaining at levels other than the workplace since they
included almost exclusively controls for workplace characteristics.
The evidence of a positive e⁄ect of workplace unionisation is in contrast with previous
￿ndings for the US (Gramm and Schnell, 2001; Houseman, 2001) and shows that Verma
(2003)￿ s conclusion that unions reduce ￿ exibility cannot be extended to Europe. This result
is important for macroeconomists who are concerned with the implications of employment
adjustments costs for price hystheresis and the persistence of shocks (Hamermesh, 1996;
Layard et al., 2005).
From the perspective of the research on modern labour markets, my ￿nding supports the
hypothesis that workplace unions, like ￿ring costs, increase contract duality. An evaluation
of the overall e⁄ect of unions on duality in the labour market, however, requires further
research into how temporary workers are treated in unionised ￿rms. Bentolila and Dolado
(1994) do not ￿nd evidence that unions give weight to temporary workers￿interests using
Spanish ￿rm-level data from the 1980￿ s. More insights on this point could come from the
use of individual (or, ideally, matched) data that enable the researcher to look at di⁄erent
outcomes of temporary and permanent workers separately.
Finally, the ￿nding of this paper leaves open the question as to what are the channels
through which the e⁄ect of unions on temporary employment unfolds. For instance, a pos-
itive e⁄ect could arise because union members bene￿t from the bu⁄er e⁄ect provided by
18temporary workers or because ￿rms hire less-unionised temporary workers to undermine the
union￿ s strength in bargaining. This is a particularly challenging empirical question for fu-
ture research since it requires ￿nding sources of exogenous shocks which might have activated
each of these channels in isolation.
199 Tables
Table 1: Share of workplaces employing ￿xed-term (FixT) workers by union status.
Country No Union Union Overall
Belgium 0.34 0.57 0.40
Denmark 0.31 0.36 0.34
Germany 0.40 0.65 0.46
Greece 0.27 0.43 0.28
Spain 0.63 0.69 0.66
France 0.64 0.75 0.67
Ireland 0.40 0.65 0.44
Italy 0.46 0.66 0.51
Luxembourg 0.34 0.48 0.41
Netherlands 0.77 0.81 0.78
Austria 0.21 0.41 0.26
Portugal 0.89 0.92 0.89
Finland 0.74 0.80 0.77
Sweden 0.60 0.70 0.66
UK 0.44 0.56 0.46
EU-15 0.49 0.67 0.54
Czech Rep 0.92 0.96 0.93
Cyprus 0.25 0.28 0.26
Latvia 0.40 0.54 0.42
Hungary 0.46 0.46 0.46
Poland 0.62 0.85 0.63
Slovenia 0.62 0.83 0.69
EU-21 0.51 0.67 0.55
Private sector workplaces with more than 10 employees.
Weighted data from ESWT 2004/2005
20Table 2: Share of workplaces employing agency workers (TAW) by union status.
Country No Union Union Overall
Belgium 0.48 0.76 0.55
Denmark 0.28 0.31 0.30
Germany 0.15 0.33 0.19
Greece 0.03 0.20 0.05
Spain 0.20 0.29 0.25
France 0.34 0.58 0.41
Ireland 0.16 0.34 0.19
Italy 0.19 0.32 0.22
Luxembourg 0.22 0.42 0.33
Netherlands 0.43 0.57 0.48
Austria 0.17 0.32 0.20
Portugal 0.11 0.08 0.11
Finland 0.24 0.26 0.25
Sweden 0.15 0.24 0.20
UK 0.29 0.43 0.31
EU-15 0.22 0.38 0.26
Czech Rep 0.10 0.14 0.10
Cyprus 0.07 0.05 0.07
Latvia 0.08 0.13 0.08
Hungary 0.06 0.09 0.07
Poland 0.03 0.02 0.03
Slovenia 0.61 0.61 0.61
EU-21 0.20 0.36 0.24
Private sector workplaces with more than 10 employees.
Weighted data from ESWT 2004/2005
21Table 3: Linear models for the probability of temporary




Dep Var: 1 if any Fixed Term (FixT) workers











Obs 12720 2929 15649
Countries 15 6 21
R2 .145 .171 .146
Dep Var: 1 if any Agency workers











Obs 12720 2929 15649
Countries 15 6 21
R2 .146 .183 .157
New6: Czech Rep, Cyprus, Hungary,
Latvia, Poland, Slovenia.
a: dummies for: employment, indep establ, head of org,
share of skilled workers, whether major variations in workload
on a daily, weekly or annual basis.
Signi￿cance levels:* 10% ** 5% *** 1%
Weighted data from ESWT 2004/2005.
22Table 4: Linear models for the probability of ￿xed-
term (FixT) workers in each country, grouped by the
centralisation index of OECD (2004).
Country Union SE Pvalue
Company and plant level predominant
Hungary 0.040 0.077 0.608
Poland 0.016 0.076 0.838
Uk -0.035 0.057 0.534
Industry and company level
Denmark 0.039 0.050 0.435
France 0.060 0.046 0.197
Italy 0.147 0.044 0.001
Industry level predominant
Austria 0.095 0.051 0.063
Belgium 0.058 0.078 0.457
Germany 0.049 0.048 0.308
Netherlands -0.026 0.067 0.699
Spain 0.001 0.042 0.983
Sweden 0.098 0.056 0.084
Industry and central level
Ireland 0.160 0.076 0.035
Portugal 0.019 0.066 0.775
Central level
Finland 0.030 0.043 0.483
Index not available




Greece 0.113 0.088 0.202
Latvia 0.127 0.122 0.299
Luxembourg 0.098 0.096 0.312
Slovenia 0.084 0.067 0.212
Data from ESWT 2004-2005.
Private sector ￿rms with more than 10 employees.
23Table 5: Linear models for the probability of agency
workers (TAW) in each country, grouped by the central-
isation index of OECD (2004).
Country Union SE Pvalue
Company and plant level predominant
Hungary 0.053 0.031 0.086
Poland -0.045 0.016 0.005
Uk -0.029 0.053 0.584
Industry and company level
Denmark -0.000 0.045 0.991
France 0.070 0.048 0.148
Italy 0.067 0.041 0.100
Industry level predominant
Austria 0.047 0.043 0.278
Belgium 0.084 0.088 0.340
Germany 0.062 0.038 0.105
Netherlands -0.056 0.061 0.364
Spain -0.000 0.032 0.995
Sweden 0.056 0.043 0.197
Industry and central level
Ireland 0.122 0.062 0.052
Portugal -0.132 0.067 0.050
Central level
Finland -0.055 0.040 0.169
Index not available




Greece 0.172 0.084 0.041
Latvia 0.032 0.087 0.712
Luxembourg 0.009 0.103 0.928
Slovenia 0.020 0.076 0.795
Data from ESWT 2004-2005.
Private sector ￿rms with more than 10 employees.
24Table 6: Share of workplaces using ￿xed-term (FixT) and agency












Private sector workplaces with more than 10 employees.
Data from Managment Questionaire of WERS 2004
Pearson-F tests independence between
use of ￿xed-term contracts and unionisation.
25Table 7: Linear models for the probability of ￿xed-term (FixT)
workers in UK private-sector workplaces.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
UnionRec .102*** .080* .083* .088*
(.038) (.045) (.044) (.046)
AnyUnionMemb .141*** .094** .082** .091**
(.034) (.039) (.041) (.042)
Firm charact.a No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Ind. Dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Reg. Dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Occup. Shares No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
RegXInd No No No Yes No No No Yes
IndXGeoMk No No No Yes No No No Yes
Obs. 1479 1208 1200 1200 1486 1210 1202 1202
Exogeneity Tests using Empl6Ago as an instrument
Obs.b 816 810 810 816 810 810
1st Stage F 1.301 13.417 9.394 1.011 16.546 11.714
P-Value .254 .000 .002 .315 .000 .001
F for Ho:Exog 2.996 .522 .001 2.892 .526 .001
P-Value .084 .470 .975 .089 .469 .974
Dep Var: 1 if any ￿xed-term workers, 0 if none.
a: Total employment, age, dummies: indep establ, multiproduct, mk shares, reg, nat, int mk
foreign comp, demand depends on price, cost targets.
b: sample restricted to workplaces in operation in 1998.
Signi￿cance levels:* 10% ** 5% *** 1%. Weighted estimates, st. err. account for complex design.
Data from WERS 2004, private sector ￿rms with >10 employees.
26Table 8: Linear models for the probability of agency workers in UK
private-sector workplaces.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
UnionRec .118*** .051 .066 .075**
(.032) (.037) (.041) (.036)
AnyUnionMemb .098*** .030 .022 .041
(.026) (.029) (.033) (.033)
Firm charact.a No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Ind. Dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Reg. Dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Occup. Shares No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
RegXInd No No No Yes No No No Yes
IndXGeoMk No No No Yes No No No Yes
Obs. 1482 1210 1202 1202 1489 1212 1204 1204
Exogeneity Tests using Empl6Ago as an instrument
Obs. 816 810 810 816 810 810
1st Stage F 1.301 13.417 9.394 1.011 16.546 11.714
P-Value .254 .000 .002 .315 .000 .001
F for Ho:Exog .276 .003 .105 .143 .036 .057
P-Value .599 .960 .745 .706 .850 .811
Dep Var: 1 if any agency workers, 0 if none.
a: Total employment, age, dummies: indep establ, multiproduct, mk shares, reg, nat, int mk
foreign comp, demand depends on price, cost targets.
b: sample restricted to workplaces in operation in 1998.
Signi￿cance levels:* 10% ** 5% *** 1%. Weighted estimates, st. err. account for complex design.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Table 11: OLS within-￿rm estimates for the probability of ￿xed-
term workers in a given occupation.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
AnyBarg .011 .018 .006
(.031) (.034) (.033)
UnionMemb .046 .026 .021
(.032) (.033) (.039)




IndustryBarg .016 ￿ .026 ￿ .012
(.053) (.047) (.050)
OrgBarg .010 .051 .044
(.032) (.037) (.040)








Occ. Controlsa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
LOC Inter.b No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Abs&Resignc No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Occup. dum-
mies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IndXLOC No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
RegXLOC No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
OccupXLOC No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Firms 1432 1382 1120 1411 1361 1102 1432 1382 1120
Occupations 4982 4848 3937 4901 4765 3865 4982
Dep Var: 1 if any ￿xed-term workers, 0 if none.
a: occupation employment size, dummy for largest occupation (LOC).
b: dummies for new workers in LOC to learn the job and LOC dummy interacted with ￿rm-level controls.
c: LOC dummy interacted with: perc. days lost due to absence in the ￿rm, share of quits over last 12m.
Signi￿cance levels:* 10% ** 5% *** 1%
Weighted estimates, standard errors account for complex design.
Data from WERS 2004, private sector ￿rms with >10 employees.
30Table 12: Wald tests for the e⁄ect of union on Pr(FixT) in the
largest occupation (LOC).
Spec 1a Spec 2a
Estimate F Stat P Value Estimate F Stat P Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AnyBarg ￿ .039 .577 .448 ￿ .026 .205 .651
UnionMemb .045 .982 .322 .077 2.141 .144
IndustryBarg .037 .181 .671 .064 .477 .490
OrgBarg ￿ .152 6.408 .011 ￿ .138 3.941 .047
LocalBarg .032 .144 .704 .016 .034 .854
a: spec 1 controls for Resign and Absence, spec 2 does not.
Weighted estimates, standard errors account for complex design.
Data from WERS 2004, private sector ￿rms with >10 employees.
31Table 13: OLS within-￿rm estimates for the probability of agency
workers in a given occupation.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
AnyBarg .049 .047 .022
(.037) (.038) (.040)






IndustryBarg .002 .053 .043
(.033) (.050) (.050)
OrgBarg ￿ .032 ￿ .032 ￿ .049
(.068) (.061) (.063)
LocalBarg .149*** .081 .062
(.050) (.052) (.055)






Occ. Controlsa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
LOC Inter.b No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Abs&Resignc No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Occup. dum-
mies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IndXLOC No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
RegXLOC No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
OccupXLOC No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Firms 1440 1387 1122 1419 1366 1104 1440 1387 1122
Occupations 5023 4874 3949 4943 4792 3878 5023 4874 3949
Dep Var: 1 if any agency workers, 0 if none.
a: occupation employment size, dummy for largest occupation (LOC).
b: dummies for new workers in LOC to learn the job and LOC dummy interacted with ￿rm-level controls.
c: LOC dummy interacted with: perc. days lost due to absence in the ￿rm, share of quits over last 12m.
Signi￿cance levels:* 10% ** 5% *** 1%
Weighted estimates, standard errors account for complex design.
Data from WERS 2004, private sector ￿rms with >10 employees.
32Table 14: Wald tests for the e⁄ect of union on Pr(TAW) in the
largest occupation (LOC).
Spec 1a Spec 2a
Estimate F Stat P Value Estimate F Stat P Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AnyBarg .067 1.937 .164 .063 1.379 .241
UnionMemb .041 2.379 .123 .068 5.602 .018
IndustryBarg ￿ .075 1.583 .209 ￿ .070 1.252 .263
OrgBarg ￿ .018 .044 .834 ￿ .004 .002 .968
LocalBarg .243 11.928 .001 .246 9.087 .003
a: spec 1 controls for Resign and Absence, spec 2 does not.
Weighted estimates, standard errors account for complex design.
Data from WERS 2004, private sector ￿rms with >10 employees.
3310 Speci￿cation using the panel sample
1. I use two measures of unionisation. The ￿rst one, UnionRecogn, is a dummy is at least one union is
recognized (either at the workplace or at a higher level in the same organization). The second one is
a dummy indicating whether there are any union members in the workplace.
2. TotalEmpl and the share of employment in each occupation. The latter should control for the fact that
￿rms might be more likely to use temporary contracts in speci￿c occupations. I also have occupational
dummies taking the value of 1 if that occupation is the largest in the ￿rm.
3. A dummy for independent establishments. The question is asked consistently in the two years and
there are no apparent comparability issues. There is some time-series variation in the variable.
4. Geographical market: dummies for local/regional/national/international market. In 1998 establish-
ments that did not trade externally were not asked this question. In 2004 the question was asked of all
the establishments. Moreover, in 2004 there is no question that allows to distinguish establishments
that did not trade externally. As a result, about 120 establishments in the private sector have missing
values on these dummies for 199819. I therefore constructed two versions of these dummies. The ￿rst
one simply treats establishments not trading in 1998 as missing values, e⁄ectively excluding them
from the sample. The second version assumes that those establishments that were not trading in
1998 continued not to trade in 2004. Therefore all of these (second version) dummies are set equal to
zero for these establishments. To account for additional (time varying) systematic di⁄erences between
￿rms not trading and the rest, I also constructed a dummy (NoTrade98) which is 1 if the workplace
was not trading externally in 1998 and zero otherwise (including all the 2004 observations). This is
equivalent to an interaction between a dummy for not trading and a year dummy for 1998. Under
the assumption that there was no change in NoTrade (so that the dummy itself does not appear in
a regression in ￿rst-di⁄erence), this additional variable captures the changing e⁄ect over time of not
trading externally.
5. A dummy for dominating the market and one for dominating or having few competitors (less than 5).
This is the best measure of market power that I can use in the panel exercise because, unlike the 2004
cross-sectional dataset, the panel dataset does not provide information on di⁄erent market shares20.
6. Following the same logic described in previous sections, I have built a few interactions to try and
capture changes in uncertainty to which a ￿rm may be exposed. In particular, I allow interactions
between (1) industry and time dummies and (2) geographical market dummies21 and time dummies
and (3) region and time dummies. Also a triple interaction between industry dummies, geographical
market dummies and the year dummy for 2004 is included. In this way, I hope to capture the change
over time in the level of uncertainty a⁄ecting ￿rms belonging to the same industry/region or trading
on markets of similar extension.
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